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ABSTRACT
Agricultural mechanization represents an important phase in agricultural development.
Unlike other modern inputs, mechanization typically involves considerable economies of scale,
affecting its adoption. Experiences show that small farmers try to overcome this problem by
engaging in a variety of contractual arrangements that allow sharing machinery services.
Taking the case of Brazilian State of Rio Grande do Sul as an empirical example, the present
paper explores the possibilities of transaction cost economics (TCE) to analyze the contractual
arrangements concerning machinery services. The paper shows that the classical framework of
TCE can be extended to account for peculiarities of transactions in this field. It is recommend-
able to take transaction costs into account together with other economic factors affecting the costs
of providing machinery services.
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INTRODUCTION
As the theory of induced technical change in agriculture holds (Hayami & Ruttan,
1985), mechanization is an important phase in agricultural development, which is sti-
mulated by raising wages in rural areas. Unlike the typical land-saving forms of techni-
cal change, such as the introduction of chemical fertilizer or improved seeds, mechani-
zation typically involves considerable economies of scale. This affects the possibilities of
small farms to mechanize their farm operations, when the economic frame conditions
require the adoption of this technical change. However, both historical1 and contempo-
rary experience shows that small farmers are able to overcome this problem by enga-
ging in a variety of contractual arrangements that allow sharing machinery services.
While the New Institutional Economics (NIE) has been widely applied to analyze con-
tract choice with regard to labor, land and credit contracts,2 NIE concepts have hardly
been used to analyze the choice of contracts concerning the use of agricultural machi-
nery. The present paper aims to contribute to filling this gap, taking a case from Rio
Grande do Sul, the southernmost state of Brasil, as an example.
The globalization of economies has confronted producers in all sectors of the eco-
nomy with new conditions. Market-oriented farmers have to be more competitive and
need to improve their quality of production. Mechanizing farming activities can contri-
bute to a reduction of production costs and thereby improve the competitiveness of
farmers. The necessity to exploit economies of scale in the use of machinery and limita-
tions in the capacity for large investments make it necessary to create new institutional
arrangements as well as improve existing arrangements to provide mechanization ser-
vices to smaller farmers. In the Central Region of the Brazilian State Rio Grande do Sul
(RS), a variety of different contractual arrangements has already emerged. Therefore,
this case is well suited to apply transaction costs economics for the study of contract
choice in the provision of machinery services.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the empirical case and highli-
ghts the contractual arrangements to be explained. Section 3 outlines an analytical
framework that includes a number of extensions of the “classical” TCE framework.
Section 4 applies this analytical framework to the empirical case. Section 5 discusses the
results and Section 6 finally draws some conclusions.
________________________________
1 See Chayanov (1919/1991), Olmstead & Rhode (1988).
2 See Hayami & Otsuka (1993).
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THE EMPIRICAL CASE
This paper is based on an empirical case study done by the first author in the
Central Region of the Brazilian state Rio Grande do Sul (RS). This region was selected
because it has a very divided farm size structure and was one of the first regions in RS
receiving subsidies and incentives to introduce the multifarm mechanization at the ear-
ly 1970s.
From the farms contracting machinery services in the region (IBGE, 1997) a sam-
ple of 121 farms was randomly selected. The data was collected through a standardized
questionnaire with open and closed questions applied by the first author on visits to
farms and the results were statistically analyzed.
In the research region, mainly corn, black beans, soybeans, wheat, rice, tobacco,
cassava, sweet potato and potato are cultivated. Fig. 1 displays the relevance of contrac-
ting machinery services for the different crops. The farms use contractual arrange-
ments for provision of mechanization mainly for the production of corn, black beans,
soybeans, wheat and rice (see Fig. 1). The types of machinery that are most often con-
tracted for these crops are the following: no tillage planters, field sprayers, stationary
threshers, combine harvesters and silage corn harvesters.
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Figure 1 - Percentage of farms contracting machinery services that cultivated
different crops and used the contracted machine for its cultivation
in the Centro-Serra Region (RS/Brazil), 1998/99
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A variety of different institutional arrangements exists for the provision of machi-
nery services (Tab. 1). The Tab. 1 shows how many farmers own the machines conside-
red herein, the share of them providing services with their overcapacity to other far-
mers3 as well as the mentions of farmers considering the provider they prefer for these
equipments. According to Fig. 1, only corn, black beans, soybeans and wheat are consi-
dered.
Table 1 - Share of farmers owning machinery as well as mentioned providers of machinery
for no planting, crop protection and harvesting in the Centro-Serra Region
(RS, Brazil) 1998/99
Machinery Farmers’ own  
Providers of contracted machinery 
(% of n 3) as percent (and number) 
Machine Value (R$)* n1 % n2 n3 
Informal 
sharing 
Farmer 
contractors 
Co-
operatives 
Farmer 
groups 
Municipal 
government 
No tillage 
planter (N=84) 5,000 27 32.1 21 57 1.8 (1)  45.6 (26) 5.3 (3) 24.6 (14) 22.8 (13)  
Field sprayer 
(N=66) 
2,000 32 48.5 24 34 2.9 (1)  55.9 (19) 5.9 (2) 35.3 (12) - 
Stationary 
thresher (N=55) 3,000 30 54.5 24 25 8.0 (2)  88.0 (22) 4.0 (1) - - 
Combine 
harvester 
(N=52) 
30,000 7 13.5 4 45 -  77.8 (35) 20.0 (9)  2.2 (1) - 
Silage corn 
harvester 
(N=29) 
4,000 3 10.3 - 26 7.7 (2)  - 11.5 (3)  46.2 (12) 34.6 (9) 
 * This value is applicable to new equipments except combine harvester, which is normally bought from other larger
farms (second-hand). 1R$ = US$ 0.52 at the beginning of 2000.
N = All cases in the sample using specific machines; n
1
= Cases using own machinery; n
2 
= Subset of n
1
 using their
overcapacity to provide services as informal sharing or farmer contractors; n
3
 = Cases contracting specific machinery;
Farmers’ own comprise those farms who own the mentioned machines and use them on their fields and in some
cases, also to provide services to other farms (as informal sharing or farmer contractors).
Source: The authors.
An interesting pattern that calls for explanation is shown in tab. 1. While it is not
surprising that the most expensive machine, the combine harvester, is owned only by a
small number of farmers, the ownership pattern of the other machines is less obvious. It
is, for example, interesting to observe that only a small percentage of farmers own the
silage corn harvester, even though it is in the same price range as the other machinery
types apart from the combine harvester. Informal sharing generally does not play a
major role. Around half of the farmers who use the no tillage planter or the sprayer on
________________________________
3 Selection bias: some of farmers owning the machines can be providers to other farmers, but as the names of
providers are not considered in this study, some machines are mentioned as “own” (by its owner) as well as
contracted from “farmer contractor” (overcapacity provided in form of services to other farms).
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a contract base, chose a type of market arrangement: contracting from another farmer.
For the stationary thresher and the combine harvester, this option is even more impor-
tant, but it does not play a role at all for the silage corn harvester.
Co-operatives, which are by definition rather large and formal organizations, play
a limited role in providing machinery services, except for the combine harvester. Far-
mers’ groups, a smaller and less formal type of organization, are not important for the
stationary thresher and the combine harvester, but they are relevant for the other ma-
chines. Finally, a state institution, the government of the municipality (prefeitura) plays
a role in supplying the machinery services of the no tillage planters and silage corn
harvesters, but not of any other machine. How can this pattern of contract choice be
explained? The following sections deal with this question on the basis of transaction
cost economics.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Transactions and their Attributes
According to Williamson (1985) “the Transaction Cost Economics [(TCE)] adopts
a micro analytic approach to the study of economic organization, focusing on transacti-
ons and the economizing efforts that attend the organization thereof. A transaction
occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface.
One stage of activity terminates and another begins”.
As the term “contractual arrangements for provision of machinery services” su-
ggest, the provision of services to farmers is the central type of transaction considered
in this paper. Therefore, when referring to this term, we prefer to use a shorter word
like “provider” of services, which includes all contractual arrangements aiming at the
provision of agricultural mechanization services.4 As has been shown by Williamson
(1985), the Transaction Cost Economics explains how transaction costs (TC) influence
the creation and improvement of contractual arrangements in an economy, where limi-
ted rationality and opportunism play an important role. The central hypothesis of tran-
saction cost economics holds that transactions are organized in such a way that the
________________________________
4 We consider as “contractual arrangement” all transactions between farmers and other agents to provide services
to the first. Of course, if farmers own all the needed equipments, they don’t need “providers” for it. So, only
farmers who do not own the equipment themselves but would like to use such machinery are involved with this
kind of transactions and resulting transaction costs.
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overall costs of the transaction – including the transaction costs and production costs –
are minimized.
Originally three main attributes with respect to which transactions – and the resul-
ting transaction costs – differ have been described (Williamson, 1985): a) asset specifici-
ty, b) uncertainty and c) frequency. Other authors introduced complexity (Shelanski &
Klein, 1995) and measurability (Barzel, 1982; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) as additional
attributes. These dimensions help to explain which contractual arrangements are most
suitable for a certain type of transactions.
Regarding to the transactions of contracting machinery services, the attributes can
be understood in the following way: Asset specificity: The extent, to which the invest-
ment in a certain type of machinery is limited to certain crops and/or activities; Uncer-
tainty: The importance of issues such as timeliness; Frequency: The frequency with whi-
ch the machine is used (number of transactions) over a year; Complexity: The comple-
xity of the contracts between the transaction partners that are appropriate to assure
their satisfaction; Measurability: The possibilities of the farmer receiving the service of
the machine to measure quantity and quality of the service.
To take the peculiarities of machinery services into account, it appears useful to
consider the following attributes as well: Requirement of group activities: The extent to
which activities (e.g. silage harvesting) for which certain machines are used, require
group activities by the farmers, involving other machines and labour; Specific hold-up
possibilities: The extent to which hold-up possibilities can arise for other reasons than
asset-specificity (as considered by Williamson (1985)). An example is silage preparation,
which has to be finished within a very limited time period after starting the harvesting
process; otherwise the entire silage can be lost.
It appears useful to consider together with the above attributes two investment
characteristics that influence the overall costs of machinery provision and the economi-
es of scale that are associated with particular machines: the investment level and the
time period for which investments are made.
Types of Contractual Arrangements / Governance Structures
Williamson (1985) focused on the question: Under which conditions are transacti-
ons organized within “hierarchies” - that is within firms - and not in markets as conven-
tional neo-classical economics suggests. Williamson (1985) also considers “hybrid for-
ms” or organization such as alliances between different firms (hierarchies). The diffe-
rent types of organizations are also referred to as governance structures.
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Some authors have argued earlier that it is useful to consider - next to markets and
hierarchies - co-operative forms as a third, distinct, governance structure (Birner &
Wittmer, 2000). Co-operative forms include both formal registered co-operatives and a
wide variety of more informal organizations. Co-operative types of organization, such
as marketing, processing and credit co-operatives, play an important role in the agricul-
tural sector, especially in developing countries. The above case study confirms that ge-
neral observation is also true for the case of machinery. For analytical purposes, it appe-
ars justified to consider co-operative forms next to markets and hierarchies as a distinct
type of organization, because these co-operative organizations are by definition non-
hierarchical and have to overcome the problems of collective action that are quite diffe-
rent from the principle-agent problem typically found in hierarchical relations. In the
agricultural sector, the state often also plays a role as provider of services and has, the-
refore, to be considered as a further distinct type of organization. Considering markets,
hierarchies, co-operatives and state agencies as four basic types of organization, the
contractual arrangements found in our Brazilian case study can be classified as follo-
wed:
1) Market arrangements: A market transaction occurs, if a farmer hires a machine
from a provider without establishing any relationship with the provider. In a typical
agricultural setting, this pure “spot market” for machinery services does not appear to
be very relevant, because the farmers may continuously hire machinery from the same
provider, thus establishing a relationship. Between the available contractual arrange-
ments farmer contractors represent the most market-oriented solution. But even here
some relationships between provider and asking farmer can be found. In some cases the
farmers prefer to re-use the same farmer contractor because of the established relati-
onship. This leads to the following type of governance structure.
2) Hierarchical arrangements: If a farmer purchases the machine for his farm,
one can interpret this as a “hierarchical arrangement” in Williamson’s sense because the
transaction is organized within the farm enterprise (hierarchy) rather than hired in
form of a market transaction. If a farmer establishes a long-term relational contract with
an enterprise to hire in machinery services, this has can also be considered as a hierar-
chical arrangement.
3) Co-operative Arrangements: The case study shows that it is useful to consider
three different types of co-operative arrangements: a) Informal sharing: Sharing of
machinery and work between neighbours without cash payment. The payment could be
in kind or even in work. This type of organization occurs mainly on farms with smaller
area; b) Farmer groups: Informal group of farmers, who buy machinery together and
1 Can transaction cost economics explain the different contractual arrangements...
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use it within the group (often extended family members and their neighbours); c) Coo-
peratives: Formal organized larger group of farms, where farmers are members and pay
annual fees and the machinery belongs to the cooperative.
4) Contractual arrangements with state agencies: In the case study the municipal
governments own the machines and provide services to farmers against monetary pay-
ment. In other situations, it is often the Municipal Bureau of Agriculture that offers
such services.
Hypothetical Cost Curves
Concerning the comparative suitability of the different governance structures for
the different transactions, we assume that co-operative governance structures are better
suited to protect farmers from hold-up situations. The larger the co-operative organiza-
tion is, the better it is suited for types of machinery that involve large investments and
need to exploit economies of scale. However, with increasing size of a co-operative orga-
nization, the internal transaction costs of organizing collective action increase as well.
Therefore, one can assume that from a certain investment level onwards, contractors
may provide the services to the farmer at a lower level of total costs, even though the
farmer has to bear the transaction costs that arise out of hold-up situations.
For types of machinery that do not require large investments but involve conside-
rable hold-up problems, contracting may never become the contract choice. For machi-
nery with very low investment levels, ownership may be the preferred form because it
does neither involve transaction costs for collective action nor for avoiding hold-up
situations. For small farmers with no access to capital, however, this option loose its
comparative advantage as soon as the required investment levels increase. Fig. 2 illus-
trates these hypothetical cost curves (costs for provision of services, including transacti-
on costs) for the three governance structures according to the level of investment.
These considerations contain some general hypotheses on the preferred contract
choice. The Brazilian case allows applying these considerations in more detail to a prac-
tical example.
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Figure 2 - Hypothetical costs for machinery provision under different governance
structures
APPLICATION OF THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO THE BRAZILIAN CASE
What does TCE predict?
The relevance of the attributes and investment characteristics for the different
machines that are relevant in the Brazilian case introduced in Section 2 are shown in
Tab. 2. As can be seen in Tab. 2, Williamsons’ (1985) asset specificity as well as the
uncertainty are more relevant for harvesting machines, particularly combines and sila-
ge corn harvesters, than for planting or crop protection equipment. The highest fre-
quency of use can be observed for the field sprayer, because this is a multipurpose
machine.
The complexity of contracts can be assumed to increase with the value of machi-
nery involved in the transaction; consequently it is the highest for combines (Shelanski
& Klein, 1995). Measurability (Barzel, 1982; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) of a machinery
service is easier for planting with planters and harvesting with stationary thresher and
becomes more difficult for crop protection with field sprayers and harvesting by combi-
nes and/or forage harvesters (Tab. 2).
1 Can transaction cost economics explain the different contractual arrangements...
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Table 2 - Assessment of some important attributes of transaction costs for the most
frequently contracted machinery in the research region
How important are the attributes on different machinery type 
Attributes of transaction 
No tillage planter Field sprayer Stationary thresher Combine harvester Silage corn harvester 
Asset specificity ++ + +++ +++ ++++ 
Uncertainty ++ ++ +++ +++ +++ 
Frequency +++ ++++ ++ +++ ++ 
Complexity ++ ++ ++ +++ ++ 
Measurability  +++ ++ +++ ++ ++ 
Group activities ++ + +++ +++ ++++ 
Special hold-up + + ++ ++ ++++ 
Planning time ++ ++ ++ ++++ +++ 
Investment level ++ + + ++++ ++ 
 
Scale: “+” not specific, certain, seldom used, simple, not measurable, no group activities required, no hold-up
risks, short planning time, low investment level – “++++” very specific, uncertain, very often used, very
complex contracts, well measurable, group activities are very important, high hold-up risks, long planning
time, high investment level. The levels “++” and “+++” are between the extreme limits and therefore,
do not need to be explained. These scales were created by the authors.
The attributes that have been introduced additionally, including amount of inves-
tment, planning period of time and group activities, seem to be helpful for explanati-
on. The amount of investment5 varies in the case study from roughly R$ 2,000 for field
sprayer to up to R$ 30,000 for a used combine (8-10 years of use). The planning period
of time is associated with the amount of investment as well as with the frequency. There-
fore, cheaper machines, like planters, sprayer and stationary threshers, imply a shorter
planning time than forage harvesters and even combines, which have longer deprecia-
tion periods. The need for group activities is low for crop protection, but increases for
planting and reaches the highest level for harvesting activities, especially for silage corn.
For harvesting silage corn, besides of the tractor for powering the harvester, at least one
more tractor with trailer is needed for transportation to the silo, one more tractor is
needed for compaction of the silo, besides the labor involved in these activities. The
corn harvesting transaction also involves the highest special hold-up possibility, as ex-
plained above.
________________________________
5 Value (investment costs) of most used machinery: R$ 5,000 for no tillage planter, R$ 2,000 for field sprayer, R$
3,000 for stationary thresher, R$ 30,000 for combine harvester and R$ 4,000 for silage corn harvester. This value
is applicable to new equipments except combine harvester, which is normally bought from other larger farms
(they are not new; new combines cost more then R$ 100,000). 1 R$ = US$ 0.52 at beginning of 2000.
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Table 3 - Importance of attributes of transactions as factors explaining the choice for or
against this type of contractual arrangement for provision of machinery services
Providers of machinery services and the importance of attributes of TC  Attributes of transactio n 
that causes  
transaction costs Informal sharing Farmer groups Cooperatives Farmer contractors  
No tillage planter  
- Asset specificity 
- Uncertainty  
- Frequency 
- Complexity 
- Measurability  
- Group activities 
- Special hold-up 
- Planning t ime 
- Investment level 
 
+  
+  
+ + 
+ + 
+  
0 
0 
+  
+ + 
 
-  
+ 
++  
++  
+ 
0 
0 
---  
--  
 
+ 
-  
-  
-  
-  
0 
0 
++ 
- 
 
+ + 
-- 
- 
-- 
-- 
0 
0 
+++ 
+ + 
Field sprayer 
- Asset specificity 
- Uncertainty  
- Frequency 
- Complexity 
- Measurability  
- Group activit ies 
- Specia l hold-up 
- Planning t ime 
- Investment level 
 
+  
+  
+ + 
+  
- 
0 
0 
+  
+ + 
 
-  
+ 
++  
+ 
- 
0 
0 
--  
--  
 
+ 
-  
--  
-  
--  
0 
0 
++ 
- 
 
+  
-- 
- 
-- 
-- 
0 
0 
+++ 
+ + 
Stationary thresher  
- Asset specificity 
- Uncertainty  
- Frequency 
- Complexity 
- Measurability  
- Group activit ies 
- Special hold-up 
- Planning t ime 
- Investment level 
 
+  
+  
+  
+  
+++ 
+++ 
+ + 
+  
+  
 
--  
++  
+ 
+ 
+++  
+++  
++  
-- 
--  
 
+ 
--  
-  
-  
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
 
+ + 
---  
- 
- 
- 
+ + 
-- 
+++ 
+ + 
Combine harvester 
- Asset specificity 
- Uncertainty  
- Frequency 
- Complexity 
- Measurability  
- Group activit ies 
- Special hold-up 
- Planning t ime 
- Investment level 
 
- 
+ + 
+ + 
- 
+ + 
+  
+ + 
- 
+  
 
---  
+++  
++  
- 
++  
+ 
+++  
---  
---  
 
-  
+ 
-  
+ 
-  
+ 
++ 
- 
--  
 
+++ 
---  
-- 
+ + 
- 
+  
-- 
+++ 
+++ 
Silage corn harvester 
- Asset specificity 
- Uncertainty  
- Frequency 
- Complexity 
- Measurability  
- Group activit ies 
- Special hold-up 
- Planning t ime 
- Investment level 
 
+  
+  
+  
+  
+  
+ + 
+ + 
- 
+  
 
---  
++  
+ 
+ 
++  
+++  
+++  
---  
--  
 
-  
+ 
-  
-  
-  
+ 
+ 
- 
-  
 
+ + 
---  
- 
-- 
-- 
---  
---  
+ + 
+ + 
“+” Indicate that attribute favors the choice of this contractual arrangement (“+” a little, “++” a little more, “+++”
the most), while “-“ indicates that the attribute discourages the choice of this arrangement (“-” discourages a little,
“—“ discourages a little more, “—“ discourages the most). Value of “0” indicates that the effect is neutral.
Source: The authors
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The next step in the application of the analytical framework consists in assessing
how relevant the attributes identified in Tab. 2 are for the different governance structu-
res discussed above. Tab. 3 shows this assessment. According to Tab. 3 especially harves-
ting machines are affected by different attributes of transactions that may cause transac-
tion costs. Initially we can observe that the asset specificity limits to some extent the
success of co-operative agreements (informal sharing and farmer groups) if compared
to market solutions (farmer contractors). On the other side, from the uncertainty, fre-
quency, complexity of contracts and measurability of service point of view, the co-opera-
tive based arrangements are more recommendable than market contracting. The need
of group activities and possible negative effects of hold-up leads to the hypothesis that
informal sharing and farmer groups fit better to provide harvesting equipment, especi-
ally stationary thresher and silage corn harvester, which need a high amount of group
activities. Considering the investment level and the planning time the market solutions
(farmer contractors) have the best characteristics. But even informal sharing may be a
good alternative, if no farmer contractor is available.
It can be seen see that the asset specificity of a transaction and its resulting transac-
tion costs for farmers when using co-operative solutions (informal sharing and farmer
groups) as provider is much higher than if using farmer contractors. Considering un-
certainty, it is observable that the more the transaction (provision of machinery services)
takes place under market conditions, the higher it will be. On the one hand, informal
sharing and farmer groups have many advantages, mainly because of the direct and
constant relationship between involved farmers. On the other hand, farmer contractors
seem to be very uncertain as provider, mainly because of the hold-up effects that may
take place if contractors prefer to prioritize other larger farms after starting service on
a smaller production unit.
The aspect of frequency seems to be quite uniform among providers. It only may
be a little higher if informal sharing or farmers groups are used because of the proximi-
ty of provider and so the higher flexibility to decide when and how often to use it,
beside of the lower rates to pay for services. As mentioned before, the complexity of
contracts increases for more expansive machines and services, because of the higher
risks for both transaction partners. However, when using a farmer contractor as provi-
der, farmers may also be confronted with more complex contracts, even if they use
cheaper machines, like field sprayers or stationary threshers.
Concerning measurability of services we can add that at the level of informal sha-
ring and farmer groups, it may be easier to measure it than when using services from a
farmer contractor. The reason why this happens is mainly because of the close relati-
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onship between asking farmer and providing organization. Considering the investment
level, farmer groups have the highest demand for capital, because of buying the machi-
nes in groups (farmer has to provide a part of the investment capital). Informal sharing
and cooperatives are in an intermediary level and farmer contractors imply lowest in-
vestment for farmers asking for services. Farmer contractors have their own capital or
lend it from other credit sources, so that the farmers asking for services do not have to
contribute directly to the contractor for buying the machinery.
Like for the amount of investment, the planning period of time is also longer when
farmers are members in a group and cooperatives. Farmer contractors represent again
the alternative where one can stay more flexible and change activities within shorter
periods of time.
As presented before, the need for group activities increases with the evolution of
the life cycle of cultivated crops, reaching the highest level for harvesting.
Comparing the predictions based on TCE with the empirical evidence
In this section, a discussion about to which extent the above predictions based on
TCE explain the empirically observed distribution of contractual arrangements that
has been presented in tab. 1 in section 2 is introduced. The figures on ownership su-
pport the expectations presented in Tab. 3, because the sprayers, stationary threshers
and also planters are cheaper machines. If they are used more frequently, more farmers
would prefer to own the technology. The silage harvester is also cheaper than the com-
bine, but very specific, and therefore ownership is not a preferred option.
Considering the contractual arrangements for no tillage planter we found – from
the more important to the less one – farmer contractors followed by farmer groups,
machinery services of local government, cooperatives and informal sharing. These figu-
res confirm our expectations, with the exception of the state as a provider. Contractual
arrangements involving the state will be discussed below, for all machineries together.
Among the contractual arrangements concerning the field sprayers, we have simi-
lar figures for the planter. Only the state as a provider is missing for this case. The share,
which involves the state in case of the no tillage planter seems to be distributed more or
less homogeneously to the contractual arrangements in case of the field sprayer. There
are two reasons why the distribution of these two types of machinery is very similar. The
first reason is that the machines are similar in the attributes that influence the preferred
contract choice. The second reason is that the use of both types of equipment is inter-
1 Can transaction cost economics explain the different contractual arrangements...
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connected. First farmers use the sprayers to apply the total herbicides that allow plan-
ting the crops directly with the no tillage planters.
According to the expectations, informal sharing and farmer groups should be im-
portant providers of stationary thresher. Considering Tab. 1 a question arises as to why
there no farmer group appears as provider? The stationary thresher is used mainly for
one specific activity, the threshing out of black beans that were collected by hand. After
starting the collection of the beans’ plants, they need to be threshed out as soon as the
plants are dry enough. If farmers wait too long, they will have losses through burst of
the strings. That is an important reason why they only start with collecting the bean
plants when they are sure the machine comes. As most farmers start harvesting the
beans at the same time, only the farmer contractors (which do not cultivate this crop to
large extents) can offer the service within a short time. Another important point concer-
ning black beans is that this crop is a cash crop that is subjected to considerable price
fluctuations. Therefore, it is rational for farmers to be flexible and switch to other crops,
like corn or soybeans, if their price expectations are not met. Therefore, investments by
farmer groups into this machine are rather risky. There is also no need for farmer
groups to invest into this machine as long as contractors provide this service, as well.
For the combine harvester, farmer contractors are the most important contractual
arrangement (78%), followed by cooperatives (20%) and farmer groups (2%). This con-
firms the hypothetical expectation that using a combine from a farmer contractor im-
plies the lowest asset specificity for asking farmer, the lowest investment level and the
shortest planning time. And considering these attributes, the cooperatives are the se-
cond best option, like the empirical results confirm. Beside that, there are several fac-
tors that explain why farmer contractors are the most important providers of the most
expensive machinery (combines) as suggested by the theoretical considerations above,
informal sharing and farmers’ groups are not a preferred option since their mechaniza-
ble area is not large enough to make this investment profitable. They would, therefore,
also have to hire out the machine in addition to using it on their own farms. However, it
appears justified to assume that a farmer contractor is better suited for this purpose,
because this option does not involve the transaction costs of collective action that arise
in the farmers’ group in addition to the transaction costs of hiring out machinery. Ex-
pectedly, the large co-operatives play a role in the provision of this machinery because
their larger membership allows using the combine harvester at a sufficiently large area.
However, farmer contractors are more flexible and may use the capacity of the equip-
ment more efficiently than cooperatives, because they do not follow regular hours of
service like cooperatives do and they do not involve transaction costs of collective acti-
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on. Moreover, the cooperatives are somehow disaccredited by farmers, mainly because
of low participation possibilities for the individual members as well as because of oppor-
tunism from specific administrations of other cooperatives. As farmer contractors gene-
rally use the equipment more intensively (more working hours per year), they are in a
better position to adopt new technologies, which makes their services more attractive
for the farmers. The high investment level also discourages the farmers’ group as a
provider. The farmers may have to use credit facilities for a risky investment, and they
may only be able to purchase second-hand machines.
In contrast to all other equipments, no farmer contractors have been observed as
providers for the silage corn harvester. More often mentioned providers are farmer
groups (46%), the state (35%), cooperatives (11%) and informal sharing (8%). The fact
that the farmer contractor is not used can be attributed to the combination of special
hold-up problems (as already explained above) and a need for group activities involved
in this machine.
Beside this, silage corn harvesting is done for animal production, which implies
that the investment into a silage harvester can be planned with comparatively large
security for a longer period of time. Therefore, as expected, different forms of coopera-
tion (groups, cooperatives, and even informal sharing) seem to be more appropriate
than the flexible structures of contractors.
Finally, a question appears: Why is the government such an important provider for
the silage corn harvester, and also for no tillage planter? The provision of machinery by
the local government does not fit into the TCE approach. Their rates for machinery
services are comparatively low because they are subsidizing their machinery to a consi-
derable amount. While contractors (and also other providers) have rates such as R$ 35
per hour of service with no tillage planter (with tractor and operator) and silage corn
harvester (with tractor and operator), the state offers the same service for R$ 16 an hour
(including tractor and operator). In the research region, mainly the smaller farms chose
to hire machinery services from the state. The service seems especially useful for those
who are located too far away from farmer contractors, and for those who are too small in
number to set up a group. On the question of why they chose other providers than the
state, the farmers with larger areas typically gave the answer: “The state may have lower
prices, but the quality of its service is much lower than that of other providers”. From
this point of view, the state could be considered as a provider of services for low frequen-
cy and low specificity. In our study region, the state services appeared more appropriate
for the smaller farmers. There is also evidence that political rather than economic fac-
tors explain the provision of machinery services by the state. In view of the high level of
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subsidies, this option also involves considerable risks. If the subsidies are cut, the service
may simply stop. If, at the next elections another politic party wins, they may have other
priorities and so these machinery services may also be reduced or even completely sto-
pped.
CONCLUSIONS
The study shows that Transaction Costs Economics is well applicable to analyze the
sharing and contracting of agricultural machinery. TCE is useful to better understand
how and why farmers prefer to contract machinery services than buying their own equi-
pment. As can be derived from the study, to analyze the variety of contractual arrange-
ments observed in developing agriculture on a theoretical basis, the classical TCE fra-
mework has to be extended in two aspects: First, besides the attributes of transactions
typically used (asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency) have to be extended. To take
the peculiarities of machinery services into account, attributes like the complexity of
contracts, the measurability of services, and the need for group activities have to be
taken into account. These attributes have to be considered together with other criteria
that influence the costs of providing machinery services, especially investment costs.
Second, it is useful to consider co-operative forms of organization as a third type of
governance structures next to markets and hierarchies to better understand contract
choice for machinery services.
The study presented here also shows some limitations of the TCE approach. Even
though public transactions have received increasing attention in the TCE literature, the
TCE approach is not suited to explain the provision of services by public agencies that
occur due to political reasons. A combination of TCE with political economy could
provide a more comprehensive framework for a better understanding of the variety of
contract choice in developing agriculture.
This study has to be considered as a first step in applying TCE to a field that has
hitherto been rather neglected in the study of contract choice in agriculture: the provi-
sion of machinery services. The author’s hope is that their paper helps to highlight the
potential of TCE in this field. Further qualitative and quantitative studies are required
to refine and test the analytical framework developed in this paper. Increasing attenti-
on to contracts concerning machinery appears justified since this issue is highly rele-
vant for small farmers in many developing countries who face changing economic fra-
mework conditions. A better understanding of the comparative efficiency of different
contractual arrangements for the provision of machinery services can help to devise
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policies that enable small farmers to become competitive under conditions of globaliza-
tion that favor mechanization and require exploring economies of scale.
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SINOPSE
A ECONOMIA DOS CUSTOS DE TRANSAÇÃO É CAPAZ DE EXPLICAR A
OCORRÊNCIA DOS DIFERENTES ARRANJOS P ARA CONTRATAÇÃO DE SERVIÇOS
DE MECANIZAÇÃO AGRÍCOLA? ESTUDO DE C ASO NO RIO GRANDE DO SUL
A mecanização agrícola representa uma fase importante no desenvolvimento da agricultura. Ao
contrário de outros insumos modernos, a mecanização envolve, tipicamente, as consideráveis economias
da escala, afetando, assim, a sua adoção. Experiências mostram que as pequenas unidades de produção
tentam superar esse problema por meio de uma variedade dos arranjos contratuais que servem para
compartilhar serviços de mecanização agrícola. Analisando o caso do Rio Grande do Sul como um exem-
plo empírico, o trabalho atual explora as possibilidades da economia do custo da transação (ECT) para
analisar os arranjos contratuais com relação aos serviços de mecanização. O trabalho mostra que a estru-
tura clássica da ECT pode ser ampliada para explicar peculiaridades das transações neste campo. É
recomendável considerar os custos da transação resultantes para o pequeno produtor junto com outros
fatores econômicos que afetam os custos de fornecimento de serviços de mecanização agrícola.
Palavras-chave: economia dos custos de transação, custos de transação, arranjos contratuais, escolha de
contrato, serviços de mecanização agrícola, Rio Grande do Sul.
SINOPSIS
¿PUEDE L A ECONOMÍA DE LOS COSTOS DE TRANSACCIÓN EXPLICAR LOS
DIVERSOS  ARREGLOS CONTRACTUALES PARA LA DISPOSICIÓN DE LOS
SERVICIOS AGRÍCOLAS DE LA MAQUINARIA? UN ESTUDIO DE C ASO DEL
ESTADO BRASILEÑO DE RÍO GRANDE DO SUL
La mecanización agrícola representa una fase importante en el desarrollo agrícola. Desemejante de otros
insumos modernos, la mecanización implica típicamente las economías considerables de la escala, afectan-
do su adopción. Las experiencias demuestran que los granjeros pequeños intentan superar este problema
enganchando a una variedad de arreglos contractuales que permitan el compartir de servicios de la
maquinaria. Tomando el caso del estado brasileño de Río Grande do Sul como ejemplo empírico, el docu-
mento explora las posibilidades de la economía del los costos de transacción (ECT) para analizar los
arreglos contractuales referentes a servicios de la maquinaria. El trabajo demuestra que el marco teórico
clásico de ECT se puede extender para explicar particularidades de transacciones en este campo. Es
recomendable tomar costos de transacción en cuenta junto con otros factores económicos que afectan los
costos de proporcionar servicios de la maquinaria. Palabras-clave: economía de costos de transacción,
costos de transacción, arreglos contractuales, opción de contracto, servicios de maquinaria agrícola, Rio
Grande do Sul.
Palabras-clave: economía de costos de transacción, costos de transacción, arreglos contractuales, opción de
contracto, servicios de maquinaria agrícola, Rio Grande do Sul.
